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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL, ) 
Plaintiff- ) 
Respondent, 
v. 
RESORT CAMPERS, LTD., DES 
TOWNSEND, TOM VEGEL, GLEN 
HATCH, DALE CHRISTIANSEN, 
JOHN W. WHITELEY, GWYN D. 
DAVIDSON, and UNITED BANK, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants-
.f\ppellants. 
' 
' I 
) 
) 
) 
) 
' I 
) 
Case No. 18262 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS 
JOHN W. WHITELEY & DALE CHRISTIANSEN 
APPEAL FROM A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
JOHN W. WHITEL.EY & DALE CHRISTI;~NSEN 
IN THE r ~ t 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN SALT LAKE C~UN~Y 
-~ \'. 
1;.-:r.s 
STA'rE OF UTAH MAY 18 1982 
THE HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, DISTRICT 
David K. Smith 
8676 South 2635 East 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
JUDGE 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellants, Dale Christiansen 
and John W. Wh~teley 
R. Scott Williams 
S'I FONG& HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Buildi~g 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Pla~ntiff and 
Respondent, American 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Respondent against Appellants 
and others, for a declaratory judgment to determine the 
meaning of a motor vehicle dealer's bond provided by 
Respondent, as surety, for one Dick Noren, doing business 
as Central R.V. Sales, as principal. The case involves 
an interpretation of the contract of the surety in favor 
persons protected under the bond, including the Appellants. 
The lower court was asked to interpret the contract of the 
surety, American Manufacturers Mutual, in light of Subsection 
41-3-16(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as revised and 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court, with the Honorable Dean E. 
Conder presiding, issued a memorandum decision on December 
24, 1981, which was reduced to judgment thereafter, wherein 
the court held that the bond issued for one year constituted 
a penal sum of $20,000.00 for which the bonding company was 
liable as against valid claims for that one year, and that 
the subsequent year's premium constituted a second penal sum 
of $20,000.00 for which the bonding company was liable as 
against claims of valid creditors. The court thus ruled that 
the bonding company was liable for claims of up to $40,000.00; 
however, claims have been asserted by creditors of the 
principal which exceed $120,000.00. All cases of all claimants 
were ordered consolidated for hearing at a future date to 
determine their validity and their right to share in the sums 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for which the bonding company was found liable, and further 
that each party is entitled to share pro-rata in the proceeds. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a partial reversal of the Declaratory 
Judgment to the extent thatthis court find that the clear and 
distinct meaning of the contract or suretyship is that the 
bonding company is liable for each claim of each valid 
claimant in the penal amount of up to S20,000.00. These 
Appellants do not, however, seek to reverse the court's 
ruling that the creditors should share pro-rata in the 
proceeds due under the bond, or that the cases should be 
heard together "'lt some future time. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or aboutFebruary 5 and 6, 1979 the Appellants 
·~ere induced by an alleged fraudulent artifice to borrow 
$18,000.00 each from Tracy Collins Bank and Trust and to 
deliver the same to Dick Noren, dba Central ~.v. Sales. 
Dick Noren then gave each a promissory note in which he 
promised to secure the funds by separate motor homes valued 
in excess of $18,000.00 each, and to repay the notes within 
ninety days. 
Subsequently, Dick Noren failed to repay the 
monies, then filed for Bankruptcy as No. 80-~0458 in the 
Central District of Utah. The parties/Appellants filed an 
action in Third District Court in and for Salt Lake Countv 
- ' 
as action no. C-80-1160, which action was stayed by the 
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bankruptcy proceedings. A separate action was filed in 
the bankruptcy court, and the proceedings were eventually 
permitted to proceed in the Third District Court. 
In the meantime Dick Noren's surety on his motor 
vehicle's bond, American Manufacturer's Mutual, initiated 
this action for a declaratory judgment against a number 
of claimants who had either filed suit under the bond or 
who had made claim under the bond, seeking to place $20,000.00 
into court for the benefit of all claimants, and to be 
releived from further liability under the bond. 
This case comes on appeal to determine the meaning 
of the contract of suretyship (the bond), and whether or not 
the bonding company should be liable for up to $20,000.00 
for each claim, or whether the claim is limited to something 
less than that. 
American Manufacturers Mutal Insurance Company 
wrote a bond, No. 8SE296415, in favor of the principals, 
Dick and Lavonne Noren, dba Central R.V. Sales, on October 
31, 1978 as required by U.C.A. 41-3-16, (1953) supplement, 
and received $400.00 premium therefore. 
on October 31, 1979, the bond was renewed by 
Dick Noren and Lavonne Norer 1 , dba Central R.V. Sales, 
for which the Respondent received an additional 5400.00 
premium. 
The bond is required by Utah statute, U.C.A. 41-3-16 
(1953), and a bond is to be given by each motor vehicle 
dealership in Utah (of which there are about 1200) regardless 
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of the sales volume of the dealership, or the size of the 
dealership. Since business in the bonding/suretyship field 
is competative in this area, and since there are relatively 
few companies engaged in the sale of motor vehicle bonds 
in the State of Utah, the business is relatively competative. 
For the bonding companies it generates approximately $480,000.00 
in gross revenues per year from Utah dealerships. 
The Utah Motor Vehicle Business Administration 
administers the provisions of Section 41-3-16 (1953) and 
is required to approve each bond; however, it does not 
prescribe the wording to be used in each bond written. The 
administrator is required only to see that the minimum 
requirements of the statute are met before approving a bond 
given to comply with the applicable statute. 
Numerous claimants have each separately ~ade clai~s 
against the principal, Dick and Lavonne Noren, dba Central 
R.V. Sales, and against its surety, American Manufacturers 
Mutual, alleging the principal conducted himself i~ such a 
manner as to give rise to liability on the part of the 
Respondent in favor of each of the claimants, of which the 
Appellants are but two. The cumulative amounts claimed by 
the claimants exceed $20,000.00, and are believed to be 
in excess of $120,000.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE BOND PROVIDES IN CLEAR LANGUAGE THAT THE LIABILITY 
OF THE SURETY SHOULD BE UP TO $20,000.00 PER CLAIM, AND IS 
NOT CUMULATIVE IN NATURE. 
-4-
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The bond of the surety, American Manufacturers Mutual, 
was issued in compliance with Section 41-3-16, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953)as amended through the 1977 supplement, which 
provides as follows: 
41-3-16. Dealer's bonds--Necessity, Filing 
Arnount--Surety--Form--Conditions--Maximum Liability 
Thereof--1. New Motor Vehicle Dealer's and Used ~otor 
Vehicle Dealer's Bond: Before any new motor vehicle 
dealer's license or used motor vehicle dealer's 
license shall be issued by the administrator to any 
applicant therefor the said applicant shall procure 
and file withthe administrator a good and sufficient 
bond in the amount of $20,000.00 with corporate 
surety thereon, duly licensed to do business within 
the State of Utah, approved as to form by the 
attorney general of the State of Utah, and conditioned 
that said applicant shall conduct his business as a 
dealer without fraud or fraudulent representation, 
and without the violation of any of the provisions 
of this act. The bond may be continuous in form, 
and the total aggregate liability on the bond shall 
be limited to the payment of $20,000.00. 
In connection with and pursuant to this 
statute, Dick Noren and Lavonne Noren, his wife, 
dba Central R.V. Sales were issued a bond on October 
28, 1978, which was renewed October 31, 1979 by 
the Respondent. The bond became effective October 
31, 1978, and under the applicable provisions of the 
bond, provided as follows: 
" ... firmly bound to the people of the State of 
Utah to indemnify any and all persons, firms 
and corporations for any loss suffered by 
reason of violation of the conditions 
hereinafter contained in the penal sum of 
Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) lawful 
money of the United States ... " (Emphasis 
added) 
and further on: 
" ... and indemnify any and all persons, firms 
-5-
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and corporations for any loss suffered by . 
reason of the fraud or fraudulent representations 
made or through the violation of any of the 
provisions of said Motor Vehicle Business Act, 
and shall pay all judgments and costs adjudged 
against said principal on account of fraud or 
fraudulent representations and for any violation 
or violations of said law duriDJ the time of said 
license and all lawful renewals thereof ... " 
(Emphasis added). 
The bond clearly does not limit the aggregate or 
cumulative liability of the bonding company to $20,000.00. 
From the wording it appears that the bonding company is 
liable to any and all persons for any loss in the penal 
sum of $20,000.00. Thus it would appear that the wording 
of the bond imposes a $20,000.00 liability limit on a per 
person per claim basis. Any other interpretation of that 
wording would unduly construe the wording beyond their 
usual and customary meaning. 
The appe~lants argue that the statute, Section 41-3-16, 
U.C.A. only sets the minimum requirements for t~e bond to 
be issued. The administrator is required to protect the 
people of the State of Utah by assuring that the bond meets 
the minimum requirements set forth in the statute. His 
testimony was that he routinely sends a bond to the attorney 
general's office to determine its legal sufficiency, and 
the attorney general who approved the wording of the particula: 
bond in question, testified that it is assigned to a 
deputy attorney general to determine whether or not it meets 
the minimum requirements of statute, not necessarily that 
it conforms to the exact wording of the statute. 
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This fact is illustrated by the fact that the wording 
of the particular bond was apparently reviewed by one of the 
assitant attorney generals in 1947, and had not been changed 
by anyone else in the attorney general's office since that 
time even though the wording of the statute had changed 
in the interim. (T. page 113). 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly adopted the position 
that a bond by its terms may be more comprehensive than 
required by statute, and that the surety is bound by the 
more comprehensive wording of the bond. Zele v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 128 P. 2nd 751 (Utah, 1942). 
In that case the sole question was whether or not 
the bonding company which assumed the role of surety for 
an employer's corporate bond which was required as self-
insurer under the then applicable workmen's compensation acts 
of the State of Utah, was liable for compensation due an 
employee, Henry Haataja, whose claim had arisen prior to 
the effective date of the surety contract, but whose claim 
was ongoing in nature. The contract did not limit as to 
time the liability of the surety. The court held that the 
surety company was liable on its bond to Mr. Haataja even 
though his claim arose before the bond was executed because 
of the inclusive nature of the language used in the bond. 
Perhaps it is more correct to state that the court held 
the bonding company was liable to Mr. Haataja for compensation 
benefits even though his claim arose prior to the execution 
date of the bond since the bond failed to mention a 
~ _,_ 
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commencement date. 
The court was clearly favoring the claimant by its 
liberal interpretation of the bond. This was so since the 
court apparently felt the public interest would better be 
served by requiring the bonding company to be liable for 
compensation in place of its principal to preserve the 
intent of the workmen's compensation act, and give effect 
to valid claims of those entitled to recovery under the 
act. Of no little concern in this reqard was that the 
bonding company had been paid for its services to act 
as surety for the corporate employer. 
In the case of Fountain Green Citv v. National Surety 
Corporation, 100 Utah 160, 111 P.2nd 155 (Ctah, 1941), the 
Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a surety 
could be bound to a higher limit than required by statute, 
where the bond was unclear as to the desigr.ation of the 
amounts due for any given claim. 
In that case an ordinance required that the water 
superintendent furnish a $750.00 performance bond as marshall 
and furnish another $1,000.00 bond as water superintendent. 
The surety company, which became his bondsman, issued a 
blanket bond in the total penal sum of $1,750.00 for "faithful 
performance of duties as city marshal! and water superintendent 
as required by law." The court held that the surety became 
liable for the full penal sum of $1, 750.00 regardless of whethe! 
the loss was due to the principal's liability as water 
superintendent or as marshall. The surety company argued that 
it should be only liable up to the sum of $750.00 if the r1~~m 
-8-
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was due to misconduct as marshall or $1,000.00 if the 
misconduct was due to his activity as water superintender.t. 
The court held that the surety was bound for loss of up to 
$1,750.00 if the loss was due from either or both jobs, 
thus holding that the language of the bond, if more 
comprehensive than the lanquage of the governing statute, 
will control. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the Fountain Green City 
va. National Surety Corporation case (ibid) adopted with 
approval the rule laid down in the Bamberg County v. 
Maryland Casualty Company, et al, case, 173 s.c. 106, 
174 S.E. 917, 918, which held that "while the statute 
required principal to furnish a bond for $2,000.00 only, 
it is my judgment that he and his surety could lawfully, 
by contract, increase the amount of the principal's bond by 
voluntarily executing a bond in a larger sum and when they 
chose to execute a bond for $3,000.00 conditioned upon the 
proper discharge of Rowell's duties as auditor and 
superintendent of education, it is my opinion that the county 
was secured as to either and both offices in that sum." 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted with favor the holding 
of Peters v. Beckdolt, 100 Ind. App. 395, 192 N.E. 116 
in the Zele case (supra.), which held that where the terms of 
a bond included a greater period of liability that the 
underlying statute required, that the longer period of 
liability of the bond was binding on the surety. 
-9-
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In a neighboring jurisdiction, the Nevada supreme 
Court held in Royal Indemnity co. v. Special Service Supoly 
Company, 413 P.2nd 500 (Nev., 1966) that a surety was liable 
on its bond which was stated more broadly than required by 
its governing statute. That case dealt with a contractor's 
bond. The surety argued that the statute did not extend 
to simple breaches of contract on the part of the contractor. 
The language of the bond itself was found to be inclusive 
enough to encompass simple breaches of contract. The court 
held alsothe broader language of the bond to be binding on 
the surety. 
In Robinson Clay Products Co. v. Beacon Construction 
Co. of Massachuse~tes, 159 N.E. 2nd 530 (Mass., 1959), the 
court held that the surety would be liable for its bond which 
contained no express provision limiti~g time in which an 
i~jured party might sue on the bond even though the statute 
pursuant to which the bond was issued included time 
limitations. The action on the bond was filed after the 
statutory limitation period had run. The court nevertheless 
found that the surety was liable on the bond because of the 
absence of language in the bond requiring a filing within a 
limited period of time. 
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Housing Authority of 
City of Miami, 256 S 2nd 230 (Fla. App., 1972), the court 
held that a bond required by statute may be executed more 
broadly than required by statute. The statute underlying 
the bond did not required liability for claims based on 
breach of contract or negligence. The terms of the bond 
included such coverage. 
-10-
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The court ruled that the bond should be construed 
against the drafter, the surety in this case, and that 
it should be construed more broadly that the terms of the 
statute which required the coverage. 
In the instant case the underlying statute does 
not require that the bond be continuous in form, it merely 
provides that it may be continuous in form, thus suggesting 
that the parties may contract otherwise. 
The statute provides that the liability under the 
bond shall be limited to the payment of $20,000.00, and one 
would assume from this wording that this sum is meant to 
be a minimum standard for motor vehicle dealers and not 
necessarily a maximum figure. The Supreme Court of Utah 
has clearly ruled that parties under a performance bond may 
contract for a higher degree of liability than the minimums 
set down by statute. The court undoubtedly is taking into 
account the ultimate beneficiaries of such an arrangement, 
the people of the State of Utah, for whom the statute was 
meant to protect. 
It is also interesting to note that the statute does 
not say that the payment of $20,000.00 is per claim or 
for all claimants. It does state that the aggregate liability 
shall be $20,000.00; however, this could mean that the 
aggregate liability per claim is $20,000.00. Whether this 
represents some confusion in the statute itself or not, 
the wording of the bond is most certainly clear that it 
does not limit the liability of the bonding company. 
-11-
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Nothing is said in the wording of the bond about 
limiting it on "aggregate" liability, or that the total 
cumulative liability shall be $20,000.00. The bond 
leaves this open, and does specifically state that it 
will indemnify any and all persons for any loss suffered 
in the penal sum of $20,000.00. The only reasonable 
definition of these terms is that each claimaDt is 
entitled to claim up to $20,000.00 for any loss suffered. 
POINT II 
THE WORDING OF THE BOND SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST 
THE BONDING COMPANY AND IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS 
The Respondent bonding company elected to utilize 
f or~s of the bond which apparer.tly had been used in the 
state for many years. There is no indication that the 
forms were provided to it by the administrator of the 
Utah Motor Vehicle Business Administration, or that the 
forms were required to be used by the administrator or 
the attorney general's office, who are required to pass 
on the sufficiency of each bond issued. 
There is evidence in the record that the administrator 
had approved riders to this bond form which changed conditions 
of the bond, thus it was not considered above arnendrnent.{'!.pg.i: 
In cases such as this, it is the bonding company who 
takes the upper hand. They are the ones who select the 
form of the bond. They are thus considered the drafting 
party. Neither Mr. Noren nor anyone else had any input 
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concerning the wording of the bond or its sufficiency. 
The company had been in Utah for several years and was 
familiar with this type of bond, which it considered a 
"no risk" bond. In other words, the bonding company 
does not consider this type of bond to be "risk" monies, 
since (a) it checks out the credit and credability of the 
principal, (b) takes back from the principal a guarantee of 
reimbursement in the event of a loss, (c) can cancell the 
bond with 60 days' notice at any time it feels itself at 
risk, and (d) conducts annual audits to insure itself 
that the business practices of the applicant are in 
conformity with accepted business practices required by 
statute in the State of Utah. 
It is significant to note that the language of 
the bond does not track the language of the statute. 
The bond could have stated that the surety was bound only 
for all loss in a total aggregate liability of $20,000.00 
suffered by reason of violation of the conditions 
enumerated in the body of the bond. Nevertheless, the 
bond failed to track the wording of the statute, and the 
bonding company chose to utilize this bond which stated 
that the bonding company would be liable to any person, 
firm or corporation for any loss in the penal sum of 
$20,000.00. 
In the Royal Indemnity Company v. Special 
service Supply Company case, supra, the concluding 
opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court stated: 
-13-
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"We are reinforced in these views by a 
~in~l point. The bonding requirements 
incident to a new contractor's license 
are expressly set forth in NRS 624, 270, 
supra. If the instant bond was intended 
only to fulfill that statute as Royal 
' ' I insists, the parties could easilv have 
drawn their contract in the exact wording 
of the statute." (Emphasis added.) 
"This to some extent they did-but they also 
spoke of "defaults" and "material bills." 
The only reasonable inference is that they 
intended to go beyond the statutory 
lanquage." 
And in the Traveler's Indemnity Company v. Housina 
Authority of City of Miami, cited supra., the court noted in 
extending the liability of the surety beyond the meaning of 
the statute underlying the bond: 
"Parties in executing a bond may contract 
for provision3 broader than the ~i~i~al 
requirements of the statute. A surety 
company is bound by any terms of its bond 
which extend beyond the statutory requirements. 
And in a case recently decided in t~e Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, by Judge James s. Sawaya, and which 
is now on appeal before this Honorable Court, and with which 
this case has now been consolidated for argument, Dennis 
Dillin Oldsmobile, GMC, Inc. vs. Frank T. Zdunich, dba Mountain 
View Motors, et al, No. 17886, Judge Sawaya ruled in partial 
summary judgment that: 
"The Bond of Motor Vehicle Dealer Salesman 
provided by defendant, Occidental Fire and 
Casualty Company, in this action, and under 
41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1?53, and bonds 
required by said Section, are for the benefit 
of any person, firm, or corporation suffering 
loss by reason of the violation by the 
principal of any of the provisions of 
Chapter 3, of Title 41, Utah Code Ann.,1?53 
or by reason of fraud or fraudulent 
representations made by said principal. 
and the limit of lia- -
- , Li_ 
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the surety under such bond is $20,000.00 
per claim, and the payment by the surety 
of one such claim in the amount of 
$20,000.00 does not relieve said surety 
of liability on any other such claim." 
A surety bond is a contract. The Restatement of Security 
states that such a contract is to be interpreted 
according to starrlards that govern the interpretation of 
contracts generally. The terms of the contract are to 
be understood in their plain and ordinary sense. The basic 
rule of construction~pplies that the contract is to be 
considered as a whole; all of its provisions are to be 
construed together. Suretyship, 74 Arn. Jur. 2nd, Section 
26 at page 28. 
If the words in the contract are not vague or 
uncertain, the court is constrained from rewriting the 
contract to conform with the words of the statute. 
Provo, City Corporation--v. Nielson Scott Company, 603 
P.2nd 803 (Utah, 1979). 
In Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2nd 169, 493 P.2nd 
1003 (Utah, 1972). the court stated: 
" ... it is equally elementary that parties 
may be bound by the language they deliberately 
use in their contracts, irrespective of the 
fact that it appears to result in improvidence, 
beyond and perhaps in excess of what the 
mythical reasonable, prudent man might feel 
constrained to venture." 
The lower court found that the words of the 
contract were vague and uncertain. Even if this court 
agrees with the lower court on that point, where there 
is ambiguity in a contract, such ambiguity must be 
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interpreted against the Respondent, since it prepared 
and/or presented the contract to the principal for 
signature. Wilson v. Traveler's Insurance company, 
605 P.2nd 1327 (Okla., 1980). The fact that the 
Respondent chose and utilized the form requires that 
he live with the ambiguities utilized in the form, 
and they must be most strongly interpreted against his 
interest. Since the Respondent's chosen form failed 
to use such limiting words at "aggregate" or "total 
liability", he should not now be permitted to claim 
that the statute now places such limitations upon his 
liability. 
If the court were to so hold, it would be placed in 
the uncomfortable position of refor~ing the cont~act to 
meet the minimum requirements of the statute, a position 
which was certainly not within the mind of either party 
at the time the contract was executed. 
POINT III 
PUBLIC POLICY IS SERVED BY EXTENDING LIABILITY 
UNDER THE BOND TO $20,000.00 PER CLAIM 
Section 41-3-16, U.C.A. (1953) as revised and 
amended was obstensibly passed by the Utah State 
Legislature to protect the public of the State 
from deceptive and fraudulent practices of new and 
used car dealers in connection with the sale of 
motor vehicles. 
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It is the general public that ought to be of 
greatest concern when interpreting any statute or 
the applicability of any bond provided pursuant to 
that statute. 
One should take note that if the court were 
to construe the bond given as a "continuous" type 
bond, that is, a bond when renews itself from year 
to year with a $20,000.00 fixed all-inclusive liability, 
some incongruous results are obtained. The individual 
pays a $400.00 yearly premium for that privilege. 
Assuming that the bond only pays on a "claims made" 
basis. If a claim is made for $20,000.00 in one year, 
and another claim of $20,000.00 is made in the following 
year, the bonding company would only be liable for 
a total of $20,000.00. 
On the other hand, if the principal had shopped 
between two bonding companies, and had obtained a 
bond from one company in one year, and a bond from 
another company in the following year, and had paid 
exactly the same premium both for the initiation of 
the bond as for the renewal, he would then in effect 
have coverage to cover both claims, i.e. $40,000.00 
rather than $20,000.00 as under the single company 
coverage. 
Clearly, such a result militates against the public 
interest, and the court would wish to protect the 
public interest to the greatest extent from the 
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fraudulent practices of deceptive new or used motor 
vehicle dealers. It would thus rule that the result 
should be the same in the case where the principal 
purchases a bond from one surety for two (or more) 
years, as in the case where the principal purchases 
a bond from two different sureties for two (or more) 
years. 
The public interest is also best served in the 
instant case to rule that where a contract enlarges 
liability of the surety beyond the statutory minimum, 
that the surety, who after all is being paid for such 
offer of suretyship, should be bound to that larger 
scope of liability. Thus, where there are numerous 
claims, all of which jointly exceed the 520,000.00 
~inimum liability imposed by statute, the court is actinq 
in the best interest of the general public, who are 
to be recipients of the legislature's i~tended protection, 
by finding that the surety is liable to each individual 
claimant up to the maximum $20,000.00 claim. 
Nor should the court feel amiss in finding such a 
result, since the statute and the bond itself, specifical~ 
gives the surety the right to determine the integrity of 
its insured, and does not govern the amount required to 
secure such a bond. 
In addition the surety can terminate its agreement, 
unilaterally with the principal at any time it feels its 
position as surety is threatened. 
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Also, the surety is minimizing (and in fact is reducina 
to nearly zero) its risk. As was testified bv the 
underwriter's agent at trial (T. page 71), the surety 
does not anticipate any loss in writing this type of 
bond. They take back a pledge against the principal 
for reimbursement of any losses they might incur as a 
result of having written a bond, and further, they take 
a credit application, as in this case, from the principal, 
to determine his net worth, and his ability to pay in the 
event of a loss claim. They also check his reputation 
for honesty, and his credit standing in the community. 
Under such circumstances, the bonding company does not 
anticipate any losses. And the rates are based upon 
loss data; rather, they are based to some degree upon 
administrative overhead to cover the cost of setting up 
a principal's account. 
Also, the court should be concerned with the practical 
aspect of holding the surety to an enlarged degree of 
liability in the instant case. Although the legislature 
did not require a bond which was based upon the number 
of employees, the sales volumn of a dealership, or the 
size of the dealership, the court should be cognizant 
of the effects of inflation in the automotive industry 
in the past several years. With the cost of new or 
used motor vehicles, it would hardly be conceivable to 
imagine that a $20,000.00 bond would not be fullv consumed 
by more than a couple of claims. 
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As the instant claim so vividly illustrates, a 
half dozen or so claimant's claims comes to more than 
six times the amount of the yearly bond of $20,000.00. 
It cannot be said that a strict interpretation of the 
statute limiting the amount of the surety's total 
liability to $20,000.00 is serving the best public 
good. 
Where two interests are to be served, the surety 
Whoprotect's the principal's obligation, and the public 
interest,. it is the public whose interest should receive 
first consideration. 
The court, by upholding a more liberal interpretation 
of the meaning of the contract, is furtheri~g the concept 
of freedom to contract. Contrary to the concept set 
out by the Respondent, such feedom of contract does not 
halt the issuance of such bonds by bonding companies. 
Bonding companies are free to contract with anxious 
dealers. Perhaps the net result is that bondir.g companies 
will be more careful in the selection of principals. 
Perhaps they will take a closer look at the credentials 
of would-be dealers. Who could dispute that such attentiot 
would inure to the public good. Since the bonds are not 
based upon loss incidence, who is to say that the premiums 
would increase significantly, if at all. The result would 
be that companies who write such bonds would be more 
selective in the persons they accept to bond. 
Of course, the bonding companies could limit their 
liability to statutory minimums, if they soap~;~-~ 
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No matter which route the bonding company takes, the 
interests of Section 41-3-16 is preserved. The actions 
of dealers who act fraudulently would be compensated 
to the injured public, and the preservation of freedom 
of contractual relations is protected. 
Aff irmance of the principal that the present contract 
expands the liability of the surety does not undercut 
the policy that bonds may be extended for a minimum 
liability of $20,000.00, since under the statute the 
dealer and the bonding company may still contract for 
such minimum coverage. But affirmance of the theory 
of the Appellants does make a statement that the court 
believes that the public interests are best served by 
requiring the surety to reimburse each valid claim up 
to a maximum of $20~000.00 per claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants respectfully submit to the Supreme Court 
that the contract between the surety and its principal 
should be read to require the surety to be bound up to 
$20,000.00 per claim for each valid claim presented. 
Of course, before the surety is bound, each claim will 
have to be litigated as to its validity under the contract 
of suretyship, and this court is not required to pass 
upon the question of the validity of those claims. 
The Court is called upon to find that the liability of 
the surety is expanded beyond the minimum statutory 
requirement of Section 41-3-16, U.C.A. , 1953 (as revised 
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and amended) . The Court should determine that the 
contract between the parties is binding upon them, 
and that ordinary interpretation of the words within 
the four corners of the contract compels the Court 
to find that each claimant is entitled to pursue his 
claim up to a maximum of $20,000.00 per claim. 
In the event that the court finds that the contract 
is ambiguous within its four corners, any ambiguity 
should be interpreted against the interests of the 
surety, since they were responsible for presenting such 
contract for execution. 
Dated this I~"""" day of May, 1982. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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Dale Christiansen and 
John w. Whiteley 
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